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Collective Identity in Germany
An Assessment of National Theories
Sean Starkweather

“Köln stellt sich quer - Tanz die AfD” by Elke Witzig is licensed under CC BY-SA-4.0

Beginning in the 18th century, the question of what makes a nation has occupied a prominent place in German
politics. From the national theories of the 18th-century German Romantics, who identified cultural and ethnic
factors as being the key determinants, to modern civic nationalists and postnationalists, who point to liberal civic
values and institutions, the importance of collective identity and how it is oriented has remained an important
topic for German scholars and policymakers. Using survey research, I assess the accuracy and relevance of these
theories in contemporary German society. I find that, contrary to the optimism of modern thinkers, German
collective identity remains aligned with the national theories of the Romantics, resulting in ethnic discrimination
and heightened fears over the loss of culture through external ideological and ethnic sources.
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The potent force of nationalism has deep roots in German
history. From the first conceptualizations of a singular
nation by the German Romantics to unification and the
1871 constitution to the post-reunification era, the manner
in which Germans have perceived themselves as a nation
has played a vital role in both domestic and international
politics. But while nationalism in the eras of Johann Gottfried
Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Otto von Bismarck, and
Adolf Hitler are generally well understood, the character of
contemporary German nationalism remains a topic of much
debate. While there have always been fringe nationalist
parties like the National Democratic Party (NDP), they
remained just that: parties on the fringes of public thought.
Indeed, the NDP has never succeeded in passing the voting
threshold of 5% needed to enter the Bundestag parliament
in federal elections (“September 24,” 2017). However,
a surge in nationalist sentiments since 2013 threatens the
multicultural society Germany has nurtured for 75 years.
This surge has been most associated with the rapid rise of
the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party following the
European debt crisis that began in late 2009. During the
eurozone crisis, five European Union member states—Spain,
Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus, and most notably, Greece—
experienced extremely high budget deficits and public debt,
triggering a sovereign debt crisis that threatened financial
institutions and the economic stability of the eurozone in
its entirety, including Germany (“The Eurozone in Crisis,”
2015). The AfD received just under 5% of the vote in the
2013 federal elections, which led many to speculate that
the party would implode soon after its conception (“Will
Germany’s,” 2013). Yet, despite initial failure, the AfD
shocked both policymakers and opponents in the 2017
federal elections by receiving almost 12.6% of the vote to
become one of the largest parties in Germany (Clarke, 2017).
This new phase in German politics begs the following
questions: does the AfD’s rise to prominence reflect a
deeper trend in how Germans perceive themselves as a
national community? Or is the AfD’s recent electoral
success simply a notable but ultimately temporary setback
to regionalist and internationalist ends? After all, 12.6% of
the vote is still not close at all to the combined 53.4% that
the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and
Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) received, and
is nowhere near a majority (Clarke, 2017). These questions
have become especially pertinent in the wake of the February
19, 2020, terrorist attack in Hanau, Germany. The attack
was carried out by a right-wing extremist whose xenophobia
led him to target two shisha bars that the Turkish community

frequented before killing his mother and himself (Kaschel,
2020). The shootings that saw the tragic deaths of ten
people—nine had an immigrant background, and the tenth
was the perpetrator’s mother—have brought these questions
regarding German collective identity to the forefront of
public discourse (Kaschel, 2020).

A surge in nationalist sentiments
since 2013 threatens the
multicultural society Germany
has nurtured for 75 years.
In recent scholarship, Allen (2010) argued that Germans
have shifted away from an ethnocentric view of national
identity towards a cultural and civic one, and Bassey
(2012) expanded on that argument in noting the formative
role that the German state has played in constructing this
more cultural and civic conception of the nation. More
famously, both Dolf Sternberger and Jürgen Habermas
have presented theories of constitutional patriotism, which
grounds collective identity in the shared norms, values,
and procedures constructed through a liberal-democratic
constitution. They have rejected the relevance of a national
identity, arguing that it will be or has been replaced by a
postnational one following World War II. Their optimism
towards a shift in collective German identity has been shared
by previous administrations and, hesitantly, by the current
government headed by Chancellor Angela Merkel.
In contrast to these perceptions, Connor (1994) asserted
that traditional German nationalism will inevitably show
increasing signs of recovery and that the “obituaries for
ethnonationalism have proved immature” (p. 181). To clarify,
Connor did not believe that German ethnonationalism
would be akin to the racially driven chauvinism that defined
the Nazi epoch, but acknowledged parallels. Other scholars
have gone further, suggesting that German nationalism
has adopted a more ethnocentric form that has become
increasingly prominent; the Brookings Institution even
published a policy brief on the new threat posed by the AfD’s
apparent ethnonationalism (Stelzenmüller, 2019).
These approaches cannot adequately account for the
resurgence of nationalism in Germany. In this paper,
I examine arguments that the form of nationalism in
contemporary Germany is of a strictly cultural, civic, or
ethnic nature, and I work to understand the state’s role in
inducing such beliefs. I begin by describing the philosophical
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frameworks of the Romantics and modern theorists. Later,
I present my argument that German neo-nationalism has
taken on an ethnocultural form that harkens back to the
German Romantics and the theories relating to postnational
identities are mistaken. To support these claims, I utilize
quantitative and qualitative sources, including voting
statistics, opinion polls, statements and speeches by various
government officials, and insights provided by scholars. These
approaches position me to assess the nature of Germany’s
neo-nationalism and the validity of its narrower conceptions.

A History of
German Nationalism
Theoretical Roots

The study of nationalism can very well be nebulous, so
defining a “nation” at its base is important in approaching
the question of German nationalism with some clarity.
Plano and Olton (1969) defined a nation as “a social group
which shares a common ideology, common institutions and
customs, and a sense of homogeneity. . . . [T]here is also
present a strong group sense of belonging associated with
a particular territory considered to be peculiarly its own”
(as cited in Connor, 1994, p. 92). In his seminal Imagined
Communities, Anderson (1983) helped shape how scholars
frame questions on nationalism by offering a good starting
point. He defined the nation as “an imagined political
community—and imagined as both inherently limited and
sovereign” (p. 6). This imagined community is limited on
the basis that “even the largest of them . . . has finite, if
elastic, boundaries” and sovereign because “nations dream of
being free. . . . [T]he gage and emblem of this freedom is the
sovereign state” (p. 7). With these insights, we can synthesize
a definition: a nation is a porous, perceived community
whose members believe they share a sense of commonness
intimately tied to a certain territory. Whether this perception
accurately describes contemporary nationalism and the birth
of the new international order will be assessed.
Johann Gottfried Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte were
among the first to create theories of German nationalism.
Herder’s transfiguration of the concept of a Volk [people] in
his 1784 Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit
[Ideas for the Philosophy of Human History] was compelling
and acted as a “radiation-point” around which the “new
gospel of nationalism” revolved (Hayes, 1927, p. 722). For
Herder, the Volk derived not through race or ethnicity, but
through the culture that one inherits as a result of being
within a particular environment (Hayes, 1927). His idea of
an environment can be broken down to three fundamental
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factors: physical geography, historical development, and
folk-character. Although Herder failed to provide a precise
definition of folk-character, it can best be described as the
overarching, generalized personality of a particular national
group. He argued that the natural state of humanity entails
that a single nation should maintain a single national culture
and, as Charles Taylor (1994) pointed out, that “a Volk
should be true to itself ” (p. 31). In other words, a nation
ought to preserve the integrity of its culture.
With regards to the ideal of authenticity, Herder asserted
that the Church, in advocating for the continued use of
specialized Latin, inhibited forms of expression through
local vernaculars. This, in turn, inhibited the nation from
realizing its true self (Schmidt, 1957). On a side note, the
popularity of Herder’s thought lends merit to Anderson’s
suggestion that the specialization of Latin played a role in
bringing about national consciousnesses that diametrically
opposed encompassing religious communities.

Although Fichte defined the
nation in terms of language and
general culture at a superficial
level, his theory ultimately
rested on ethnicity.
While Herder stated explicitly that he spoke of culture in a
broad sense, there is some disagreement regarding Fichte’s
arguments as to what made the nation. It is commonly
believed that Fichte’s 1808 Reden an die deutsche Nation
[Addresses to the German Nation] merely narrowed the scope
of Herder’s theory in that Fichte saw the purity of the native
language, a cultural artifact, determined a national identity
(Martyn, 1997). Although Fichte defined the nation in
terms of language and general culture at a superficial level,
his theory ultimately rested on ethnicity. His appeals to
Abstammung and Abkunft [descent and origin] occupied a
prominent place in his thought, especially in his Reden. And
though he officially rejected shared language as the principal
component of a national identity, Fichte’s consistent references
to descent and origin betrayed his explicit denunciations
of shared blood (Abizadeh, 2005). Indeed, according to
Abizadeh (2005), Fichte’s call for die ursprüngliche Sprache
des Stammvolkes [the original language of one’s ancestral
people] when speaking on the expressive freedom of a nation
was inseparable from genealogical purity. As Abizadeh noted,
“Language must indeed coincide with descent” (p. 354). The
twin ideas of a history and ancestry common to all Germans
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are therefore components of Fichte’s theory of nationalism,
regardless of whether he acknowledged it or even desired it.
Language only constituted a component of the theory, not
its entirety. Although Fichte did not offer an ethnonational
historiography for the German people, the idea of an
ancestral bond between all Germans was compelling, and
his work would be invoked by future German nationalists,
particularly the traditional conservatives and the Nazis
during the Weimar Republic. Hence, many historians have
attributed the fervor with which the Nazis pursued their
ambitions to theorists like Fichte (e.g., Kaufmann, 1942).
The German Romantics’ concept of the nation rested on an
ethnocultural foundation. Though Herder’s approach rested
on a broad culture, Fichte provided a more precise argument
as to what gave life to the nation and what differentiates
it from other nations by emphasizing people’s ancestral
history. However, whether the Romantics were accurate in
describing the essence of nations can only be determined
when contrasted with modern conceptions.

Modern Theories of Nationalism

While ethnocultural theories of nationalism found favor
among academic circles prior to the conclusion of World War
II, the end of the war in 1945 and the beginning of the Cold
War brought forth a number of theories positing that nations
are defined in civic terms. To modern theorists, nations derive
from the idea that “political attachment ought to centre on
the norms, the values and, more indirectly, the procedures
of a liberal democratic constitution” rather than less tangible
notions of culture, ethnicity, and language (Müller &
Scheppele, 2008, p. 67). The division of the German state
into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) on the west and
the German Democratic Republic on the east spawned two
distinct theories of constitutional patriotism: the “protective”
patriotism of Dolf Sternberger, which emphasized the
physical structure of a nation, and the “purifying” patriotism
of Jürgen Habermas, which emphasized its ethical structure
(Müller, 2006). These theories stemmed from a series of
lectures given by Karl Jaspers in 1946 wherein he argued that
German solidarity could be found only in reflecting on their
involvement in World War II and the Holocaust.
It was from the insights offered by Jaspers that Sternberger
constructed his theory of Verfassungspatriotismus [constitutional patriotism] (Bagchi, 2016). Sternberger argued that
collective identity should derive from the institutions of the
democratic state and the general concept of the rule of law.
As Müller (2006) pointed out, this argument depended on a
“‘militant democracy’ capable of defending itself against its

internal and external enemies” (p. 284). Having witnessed
the Weimar Republic’s collapse and the fragmentation of
German society into rigidly defined factions, he saw this
political attachment to the state as necessary for social
cohesion and stability (Müller, 2006). The idea that there are
enemies that the state must be defended against suggests that
he was not idealistic enough so as to embrace cosmopolitan
notions of identity. Rather, Sternberger’s theory danced
between the ethnocentric chauvinism of nationalism
on the one hand and the idealistic internationalism of
cosmopolitanism (Kobyliński, 2017). He saw the primary
role of politics as the eternal push towards peace and his
constitutional patriotism as the vehicle by which it could be
achieved in a democratic state. To emphasize the plausibility
of his theory, he offered an interpretation of history positing
that traditional European states had been characterized by the
presence of constitutional patriotism, particularly Germany
under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck.

For Sternberger, the Holocaust
brought about the collective
emotional conditions that
would push society towards
constitutional patriotism.
Sternberger employed arguments that made use of the
Jaspersian concept of “metaphysical guilt,” which referred
to the fracturing of solidarity that Jaspers saw across human
beings and the collective responsibility Germans felt after
the Holocaust (Müller, 2006, p. 280). For Sternberger, the
Holocaust brought about the collective emotional conditions
that would push society towards constitutional patriotism.
Considering the historical precedent and the situation of
German society, the shift back to constitutional patriotism
following the divergent path that the state took in the 1930s
and 1940s was, in Sternberger’s eyes, likely and perhaps
inevitable after 1945 (Kobyliński, 2017, p. 47).
Jürgen Habermas’s theory of constitutional patriotism was
inspired by but diverged from Sternberger’s at a fundamental
level. Unsurprisingly, Habermas’s theory reflected the new
optimism that had swept Europe’s intelligentsia in the late
stages of the Cold War: instead of grounding collective
identity with the state and the physical institutions
associated with it, Habermas pinned his theory on the
liberal political principles and values embedded within a
constitution (Kobyliński, 2017). He believed that a return to
the pre-national patriotism espoused by Sternberger was not
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even possible given recent history. Rather, using Lawrence
Kohlberg’s theory of moral development, he conceived that
individuals would develop “post-conventional identities” in
which they would construct reasoned moral philosophies
and abide by them honestly (Müller, 2006). It is here that
Habermas’s theory maintains a rationalist line of thought:
the restructuring of the traditional German state to adhere
to the Rechtsstaat [rule of law] and the Sozialstaat [welfare
state] would enable people to engage in the public sphere so
they can reason with one another as free individuals (Müller,
2006). The rule of law would push a substantive view of what
constituted universal norms and protect democratic processes,
and the welfare state would provide the material conditions
necessary for individuals to engage in such democratic
processes as equals. Habermas then focused on the question
of German guilt, and it is in the controversy surrounding
how best to handle this guilt that the question of the nature
of German nationalism takes root; this controversy came to
be known as the Historikerstreit [historian’s dispute].

For Habermas, the Holocaust
was a lesson for humanity as a
whole, and German guilt could
lead to an identity based on a
common sense of humanity.
In contrast to more conservative thinkers, Habermas
regarded arguments that the only way to establish a stronger
collective German identity was to embrace a “moderate or
accepting view of the Holocaust” as simply old-nationalistic
(Menent, 2018). For Habermas, the Holocaust was a lesson
for humanity as a whole, and German guilt could lead to
an identity based on a common sense of humanity that
transcended the forms of identity seen earlier in the century.
Thus, the German nation would hardly be a nation at all, but
rather a social group of people unified by shared liberal values
and a public sphere where they could engage in politics. The
factors once believed to help establish a nation—like common
language, history, and ancestry—were thus nonfactors in
Habermas’s view, at least in the post-war era. To him, the
diminishing importance of traditional national identities
would lend itself to European integration, for there would
be a particular good common to different communities in
the form of a shared legal system (Menent, 2018).
Though Habermas’s later attempts to extend his theory to
all of Europe and incorporate the possibility of a European
identity has faced much more criticism among scholars, it
continues to find support in the post-war era and has been
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adopted by a number of eager, idealistic European politicians
committed to the idea of a regional community bound
together by liberal democratic values.
To recapitulate, the 20th century has seen the emergence of
theories of constitutional patriotism that reject conventional,
traditional conceptions of national identity associated with
the German Romantics and Nazi ethnonationalists. Instead,
these modern theories of collective identities are grounded in
either concrete ideas pertaining to the state or abstract ones
pertaining to liberal democratic values. These theories gained
traction in the late 20th century, and while many have since
been disillusioned, they remain prominent as a consequence
of recent German policy and the perceived potential in the
EU’s ability to nurture a transcendent European identity. In
2016, Minister of Foreign Affairs Heiko Maas even stated that
“[Germany] has a murky past, but our parents’ generation
has created a modern Germany: cosmopolitan and liberal
domestically, good neighbors and peaceful partners abroad”
(Brady, 2016). It is apparent that a civic postnational view
remains influential, at least within the state. For these
modern theories to be determinedly accurate, there must be
evidence demonstrating that German guilt has maintained
its resilience as a social phenomenon and cultural or ethnic
differences are marginal factors that have little to no effect in
interactions between individuals.
Although the idea that the end of history had been reached
is not nearly as promising as it once had been, and political
theorists like Habermas and government officials concede
that there remain a number of challenges that regional
institutions like the EU must face, they are firm in their
belief that the advent of postnational societies or civic-based
nations is imminent. Many western European countries have
pursued a form of regionalism wherein national identities are
superseded by a broader European identity, but no country
has pursued this ideal with more fervor than Germany. From
the outset, the new FRG under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer
has adopted a foreign policy of Westbindung [binding of
the West], sowing the seeds for a long-term project of
incorporating the people into a greater European collective.
Currently, many believe that this project has begun seeing
success or at least managed to nurture a national identity
predicated on civic elements. This is seen most clearly in a
statement by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Germany’s longestserving foreign minister: “the more European our foreign
policy is, the more national it is” (as cited in Kirchick, 2018).
While I disagree with Genscher’s assessment, the arguments
presented in its defense speak to the complexity of the
questions being addressed.
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Questioning German Guilt

Modern theorists have pointed to German guilt as the catalyst for a new constitutional patriotism that would replace
the traditional form of nationalism. This position is reasonable considering that Germany experienced a period of nearly complete suppression of nationalist sentiments by both
the government and the general public in the years immediately following World War II (Berlin, 2003). The tragedies
brought about by Hitler’s regime—a regime many supported
or were sympathetic to—diminished all traces of nationalism in German society (Breuilly, 1992). However, the initial
absence of national sentiments may not preclude a later rise
of nationalism and nationalistic behavior. If this is the case,
does German guilt ensure that nationalism will permanently
remain at the fringes of political life?
Allen (2010) pointed to the failure of the “New Right” in
procuring significant support among the general population
as one indication of the German people’s shift away from
an ethnocentric view of the Volk. While believing in overtly
positive responses to these questions may have been reasonable, Connor (1994) provides an argument that tempers the
implications of Allen’s (2010) claim:
Germans [had] held their ethnonational proclivities
in tight rein. But as memories recede, as the realization grows that Nazism and German nationalism
are not inevitably synonymous, as pride of postwar
material and cultural achievements takes on the hue
of pride in German achievements, as older Germans
come to believe that Germany’s period of atonement
and parole has lasted long enough, and as a postwar
generation that believes it cannot be held in any way
culpable for the mistakes of its parents comes into
power, German nationalism manifests commensurate signs of recovery. (p. 181)
Because the initial disappearance of German nationalism was
the product of German guilt, there is a finitude that characterizes the suppression of nationalism. Specifically, the
temporal aspect of this suppression, which has involved the
voluntary participation of the people under the state, is such
that time nullifies the effects of German guilt. Thus, when
Alexander Gauland, then an AfD candidate for the Bundestag, stated that Germans “have the right to be proud of
the achievements of the German soldiers in two world wars”
and when AfD’s chief in Thuringia Björn Höcke declared the
Holocaust memorial in Berlin a “monument of shame” and
called for a “180-degree turnaround” with regards to German

guilt, the responses were not a unified outcry against such
sentiments being clearly nationalistic, but a mixed batter of
utter outrage, sympathy, and agreement (as cited in Dearden
2017; as cited in Huggler, 2017). Höcke later clarified that
the Holocaust “is part of our history. But it is only part of our
history” and that “guilt consciousness alone cannot create a
healthy identity, but only a broken one” (as cited in “Fury
as AfD,” 2017). Yet even his clarification directs attention
to the problem of German national identity as it relates to
the feelings of guilt, and more importantly, it hints towards
the temporal aspect of guilt. As time passes, events fade into
the backdrop of history, and the tragedies once believed to
be embedded within the German character become dulled
within the memories of the German people.

While the New Right may have
been at the fringe earlier, it is
presently a powerful force to be
reckoned with.
Consequently, the state’s attempts at forcing public conscious reflection have been met with increasing confusion
and resentment. A divide exists between the state’s perception of how the German nation ought to be defined
and the perception held by many of its people. Although
Allen (2010) was correct in asserting that Germans have
shifted away from a strictly ethnocentric understanding
of the nation, his implicit conclusion that shared history plays no role does not account for the time factor,
which cannot be ignored considering the emotive nature
of guilt. The rapid rise in popularity of the AfD lends
merit to this idea, for the relative weakness of right-wing
parties in the early 21st century has, over the course of a
decade, shifted into relative strength. The AfD is seen as
an ever-increasing threat by the left-wing and moderate
parties, especially after the 2017 federal election. While
the New Right may have been at the fringe earlier, it is
presently a powerful force to be reckoned with.

A Popular Nationalism

What are the reasons for the feelings of disenfranchisement
and concern that led to the rise of popular nationalist parties
like the AfD? To what extent do they speak to the nature of
Germans’ view of the Volk? Some scholars point to economic
factors, such as low income and unemployment, as being
responsible for increases in nationalist sentiments (Hill,
2017; Staudenmeier, 2017). Unfortunately, these factors do
not adequately explain the increase in support for the AfD
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and certainly not the revival of nationalism. To determine
the underlying factors, it is necessary to analyze public
opinion in a broader sense, and polling and survey data offer
good windows of opportunity for determining the content of
German collective identity. In analyzing this data, notions of
a German nation predicated on civic values and institutions
begin to fall apart, and the reality of an ethnocultural
conception of the nation becomes more evident.

Surveying “Germanness”

Language and religion are typically seen as the cornerstones
of German culture, although the arts occupy a clear place as
well. It may be pointed out that Catholic-Protestant divisions
contradict the notion that religious affiliation is a primary
binding factor; however, this superficial divide is superseded
by a general sense of shared faith in Christianity in the face
of the perceived threat of Islam. One of the most significant
concerns held by Germans is the “loss of culture, values, and
the way of life we grew up with”: in 2017, 19% believed that
it was the greatest threat to the future of their children, and
95% of those who voted for the AfD believed that Germany
would experience a real loss of culture (Center for Insights in
Survey Research, 2017; “Umfragen zur AfD,” 2017).

The issues that Germans value
reveal how the AfD grew its
voter base so rapidly in
just four years.
This perceived danger can, to an extent, be seen as stemming
from the influx of Muslim refugees since 2015. Notably, 16%
of respondents in a Center for Insights in Survey Research
(2017) poll saw the refugee crisis as the biggest problem facing
Germany and 20% believed it was the biggest issue facing
Europe as a whole. Another survey found that 71% of all
respondents were in favor of limiting the number of refugees
in the long run, and 79% felt more needed to be done to
integrate refugees (“Umfragen zur Flüchtlingspolitik,” 2017).
It should be noted that 54% of respondents believed that
the refugees were an enrichment for the country (“Umfragen
zur Flüchtlingspolitik,” 2017). Still, 57% of all survey
respondents and 92% of Afd supporters were worried that
the influence of Islam was too strong (“Umfragen zur AfD,”
2017; “Umfragen zur Flüchtlingspolitik,” 2017). Perhaps
due in part to this perception, 52% of Germans either
entertained the idea or were in favor of a “dominant culture”
(“Over 50% of Germans,” 2017). Given that a significant
portion of those who voted for a left-wing or center party
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in the 2013 elections switched affiliations and voted for
the AfD in 2017—of the nearly 6 million votes that the
AfD received in 2017, over 1 million of those votes came
from those who voted for the CDU in 2013—the issues
that Germans value reveal how the AfD grew its voter base
so rapidly in just four years (Burn-Murdoch et al., 2017).
Considering that the AfD desires cultural preservation and
calls for the government to actively protect German culture
as the “predominant culture” in its “Manifesto for Germany,”
it is reasonable to presume that those concerned with the loss
of German culture may feel the pull-factor of the AfD and
the push-factor of what they perceive as the negligence of
the parties they voted for in earlier elections (Alternative für
Deutschland, 2017; Center for Insights in Survey Research,
2017; Holscher et al., 2017).
The array of survey data suggests that the sentiments and
policy prescriptions typically attributed to the AfD and other
far right-wing groups are much more prevalent than believed.
Cultural artifacts remain vital components of German
collective identity. Germany’s neo-nationalism, therefore,
cannot be condemned out of hand as simply a radical
ideology maintained by fringe movements. Rather, it must
be recognized as a genuine reaction to a perceived sudden
shift in the normative social dynamics that characterize
German life.
It is important to note that Germans seem not in favor
of rejecting or deporting all incoming refugees, but of
expediting the process of deporting asylum seekers who have
already been rejected. Additionally, Germans are willing to
accommodate refugees insofar as the refugees are willing to
integrate into society. This willingness is marked by a general
acceptance of institutional methods for integrating and
potentially assimilating refugees among other immigrants.
In a recent survey, 76% of Germans without a migrant
background agreed that immigrants ought to “adapt their
behavior to German culture,” and 83% with a migrant
background responded the same way (Chase, 2016). Though
the disparity is not too great, it suggests, as Federal Minister
Peter Altmaier stated, that the desire to assimilate on the part
of immigrants in a broad sense is “abundantly and distinctly
present” (as cited in Chase, 2016). Even though this data
demonstrably undermines the postnationalist vision, it also
shows the cultural aspects that underlie “Germanness.”

Immigration

While the proposition that German neo-nationalism has assumed the ethnocultural trappings of Herder and Fichte as
it did in the late 18th and early 19th centuries can be argued
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simply on grounds of general public opinion, it is in studying the real dynamics between ethnic Germans and those
with migrant backgrounds on a more intimate level that the
nature of neo-nationalism in Germany becomes more apparent. Both steady flows and sudden influxes of immigrants
are nothing new to Germany. As Bade (1995) observed,
“since the late nineteenth century, transatlantic emigration
from Germany has decreased while continental labor immigration has increased” (p. 515). More relevantly, Goodman
(2007) asserts that “the postwar story of German economic
and social change has been very much informed, possibly
dominated, by de facto immigration” (p. 100). Indeed, the
Wirtschaftswunder [economic miracle] of the 1950s led to labor shortages that required the FRG to pursue policies that
encouraged immigration of Turkish Gastarbeiter [guest workers]. But there is a major difference between immigration into
Germany in the late 19th century and in the postwar era: in
the former period, the government reacted in a hostile manner to the influx of early immigrants, especially in Prussia
(Bade, 1995). It was during this time that Germany was led
from ethnocultural to ethnonational conceptions of the nation as the government of the late 19th century “bound civil
rights to the principle of ethnic descent,” thereby reaffirming
jus sanguinis [the principle of ethnic heritage] (Bade, 1995,
p. 522). By extension, the emphasis on ethnic background in
relation to questions of citizenship laid the groundwork for
the ethnic nationalist fervor that took Germany by storm in
the 1930s through the outspoken rhetoric of politicians like
Heinrich von Treitschke and, of course, Hitler.
In contrast, immigration in the postwar era was encouraged
by the FRG, even after reunification in 1990. Yet, despite the
state’s genuine and commendable attempts to bring about a
new age of multiculturalism and define the German nation in
terms of civic values and democratic institutions, the public
has nonetheless been much more reserved. The case of the
Turkish population provides a rich instance in this regard.

Integration

The FRG does not track race in its census. However,
independent analyses have been conducted that involve a
number of different variables, like intermarriage, naming
habits, and name-based discrimination. The rate of ethnic
intermarriage is a powerful indicator of a minority’s
assimilation into their new society; it is certainly one of the
most easily observable signs of assimilation as well (Gerhards
& Hans, 2009). It reflects the amount of interaction between
members of different ethnic groups and their willingness to
accept and accommodate one another (Janßen & Schroedter,
2007). According to the Migration Policy Institute (MPI),
the intermarriage rate among first-generation Turkish men

in 2008 was 7.1% and 12.1% for second-generation Turkish
men; first-generation Turkish women had an intermarriage
rate of 2.6% (Nottmeyer, 2009). The MPI even asserted
that the increase in intermarriage between first- and
second-generation Turks in Germany indicated “the second
generation’s greater commitment to and integration into
German society” (Nottmeyer, 2009). Intermarriage rates
between Turks and Germans have, in fact, risen since 2008.
As of 2017, the rate among Turkish women was 14% while
the rate among Turkish men was 19% (“Love in Germany,”
2018). This increase in intermarriages suggests not only
a willingness among the Turkish population in Germany
to integrate, but that there are increasingly more ethnic
Germans willing to accept and accommodate Turks into
German society. This seems to vindicate, to a small degree,
the cosmopolitan claim that Europeans are moving beyond
traditional nationalisms.

Some have wrongly used
these findings to push an antiimmigrant, anti-Muslim rhetoric.
It must also be considered that the ethnic component of
collective identity can potentially detract with regards to
Turkish integration. A 2018 study by the Center for Turkish
Studies at the University of Duisburg-Essen found that 89%
of Turks feel they belong either “strongly” or “very strongly”
in Turkey, greater than the 81% that answered in the same
manner regarding Germany (Sauer, 2018). This dual identity
leads to Ross’s (2009) assertion that “the strong ethnic ties and
identification with the homeland that characterize GermanTurks provide meaning and comfort in daily life, but appear
to impede assimilation” (p. 710). Some have wrongly used
these findings to push an anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim
rhetoric. Kern (2016), for example, emphasized that ethnic
Turks are, on average, “economically and educationally less
successful than other immigrant groups.” Taken alone, this
statement appears to be simply factual. However, when
grouped with survey data that highlight only the negative
elements of the Turkish population in Germany, the result is
a view slanted to enhance a preconceived political ideology,
which neglects the real progress made by German Turks
towards assimilating and integrating. Although it may appear
ethnic Turks are “resisting” assimilation and less inclined
to assimilate compared to other minorities, the Turkish
population’s relative acculturation is roughly equal to other
immigrant populations that originate from countries that are
culturally closer (Gerhards & Hans, 2009). In simpler terms,
as Pokorny (2017) noted,

James Madison Undergraduate Research Journal

43

Hans (2010) shows that the majority of immigrants
do in fact assimilate into German society. The first
generation generally does not assimilate completely, but some members of the second generation become totally assimilated. When it comes to the consumption of high culture, Hans (2015) notes that
third-generation immigrants are no different from
young Germans. (p. 11)
Despite this reality, many Germans have tended to distinguish
themselves from German-Turks, as evidenced by the famous
departure of Mesut Özil from the German national football
team; Özil was quoted as saying, “I am German when we win,
but I am an immigrant when we lose” (as cited in “German
Turks still rooted,” 2018). Inter-ethnocultural relations may
have improved, but there is clearly much progress to be made.

Hyphenation

Although there are a number of modes by which to
demonstrate ethnic socialization between ethnic Turks and
Germans, ethnic acculturation is most simply demonstrated
via naming habits. Gerhards and Hans (2009) found that
while Turks were less likely to give their children German
names, having close interethnic relationships of any kind
with ethnic Germans greatly increased the likelihood that
a Turk would opt for a German name for their child, and
“a high share of Turks married to German partners adopt
naming habits completely in line with ethnic Germans.”
Moreover, given that names are associated with particular
ethnic groups, this also reinforces the idea that there is in
fact a strong ethnic component to collective identities and
how they are developed.
The existence of name-based discrimination is a powerful
indicator of the importance of ethnicity as it relates to identity.
Names have long been an identifier of ethnic background.
In Bosnia, for example, last names specifically were used to
identify friend and foe as the new country collapsed into
civil conflict in the early- to mid-90s (Nye & Welch, 2017).
While name-based exclusionary behavior in Germany is not
nearly as dramatic as in Bosnia, there is strong evidence that
ethnic discrimination against individuals with identifiably
Turkish names still exists in German society, particularly
in schools and the workplace. In schools, Bonefeld and
Dickhäuser (2018) found that “when a student was assumed
to have a migrant background [through names], the dictation
was graded less favorably compared to a student without
a migrant background, namely by 0.3 grade steps” (p. 7).
Bonefeld and Dickhäuser (2018) noted that this disparity is
more likely a result of a positive bias toward students without

44

a migrant background than a negative bias towards students
with a migrant background. This bias may play a role in
students with migrant backgrounds attending lower-track
schools compared to native ethnic Germans.

The ethnic component of
collective identities is still
important in how people
interact in German society.
Ethnic discrimination also exists in the workplace. Kaas
and Manger (2012) found that applications marked by an
identifiably German name were 14% more likely to receive
callbacks from larger firms and 24% more likely to receive a
callback from smaller firms than similar applications marked
by an identifiably Turkish name. Again, the name-based
discrimination found in the study was less severe than in other
countries, like Greece against Albanians, Sweden against
Arabs, and the United States against African Americans.
These disparities in how students and applicants are treated
based on their names indicate that the ethnic component of
collective identities is still important in how people interact
in German society (Bonefield & Dickhäuser, 2018).

Conclusion

German neo-nationalism, which has revealed itself gradually
since 2013, has taken on an ethnocultural form that reflects
19th century theories on what constitutes a nation according
to the German Romantics. This is the case despite the
FRG’s attempts to develop a multicultural society in which
German identity is grounded in democratic institutions.
Many politicians, theorists, and laymen alike argue that
ethnocultural conceptions of the nation are anachronistic
in the contemporary era and only the radical segments of
the German population retain such conceptions. By and
large, however, Germans have exhibited great concern as to
the preservation of cultural artifacts, like language, arts, and
religion, which they perceive may be under threat, especially
following the influx of Muslim refugees in recent years.
Ethnicity remains an important part of Germany’s social
dynamics, and judgments about the character of an individual
are still made on the basis of ethnic/migrant background, even
though the practice is not as prevalent as in other countries.
It can therefore be said that German collective identity is not
as firmly grounded in a constitutional patriotism or a form
of postnationalism as many would like to believe. Instead,
German collective identity involves strong cultural and
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ethnic elements that define how Germans view the Volk. This
is reminiscent of the theories of Herder and Fichte that played
important roles in how the 1871 German Constitution was
framed with regards to the national question. The FRG’s
failure to construct a more civic-based definition of the nation
speaks to the people’s unwillingness to detach themselves
from their cultural and ethnic heritage—the lasting outrage
against Merkel and Altmaier’s handling of the refugee crisis
is evidence of this intractability.
To the dismay of those hoping for a civically-defined
national community, traditional collective identity in
Germany has proven remarkably resilient after decades
of state-led efforts at nurturing a more civic-oriented
society; the perceived importance of one’s cultural history
and ancestral origins will remain at the heart of the
German nation, much to the detriment of Germany’s
ethnic minority populations. However, the real shift in
perception should not be neglected. Germans do not
take as kindly to the AfD as 1930s Germans did with the
NSDAP and often object to the party’s rhetoric. Equally
importantly, many of the socioeconomic issues that have
fermented nationalist sentiment are resolvable by the
state, and an increasing number of Germans intermarry
with those of differing ethnicities. Thus, there is still
yet hope for a postnational constellation, even if recent
history suggests otherwise.
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